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and Empresa filed restricted appearances
as owner and owner pro hac vice, respec
tively.
Central Hudson then brought an action
in personam against Empresa in the
Southern District ofNew York and an ad
ditional quasi in rem action in Louisiana
against another ship operated by Em
presa- both actions being consolidated
in the New York court. The district court
decided in favor of Central Hudson in the
in rem proceeding, awarding damages to
talling $4,477,584. 1 5, greater than the
amount provided for in the letter of un
dertaking, but dismissed the in personam
suit against Seiriki for lack of jurisdic
tion. The district court also held in favor
of Central Hudson in the suit against Em
presa, awarding the amount of the defi
ciency from the in rem j udgment plus pre
judgment interest- $ 1 ,850,895.83 in
totaL
Empresa appealed the district
court's rulings.
On appeal, the second circuit decided
whether a district court sitting in admi
ralty could enter an in rem judgment in
excess of the value of the subject res or
the substituted bond and whether the in
rem judgment of an admiralty court bars
a subsequent in personam action against
the bareboat charterer of the subject ves
sel for a deficiency in the prior in rem
judgment
The court of appeals began its analysis
with an affirmation of the general rule
that in rem judgments may not be ren
dered in excess of the value of the res or
the substituted bond because in rem pro
ceedings are brought against the res itself.
7A JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE � E. l 6[2], at E-779
(2d ed. 1 995). The court then asserted
that district courts sitting in admiralty are
not bound by the general rule by virtue of
their equitable powers. The Minnetonka,
1 46 F. 509, 5 1 5 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
203 U.S. 589 ( 1 906)). The court stated
that admiralty courts may award damages
in excess of a letter of undertaking which
was delivered to avoid the arrest of a ves
sel, adding the caveat that this does not
allow execution of judgment for the defi
ciency against parties not found liable in
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of Civil Procedure specifically allows
both in rem and in personam actions
against possibly liable parties, the court
found that the doctrine of res judicata,
if applicable, was the only bar to the in
personam action by Central Hudson.
The court determined that res judicata
was not applicable unless Empresa was
in privity with Seiriki, the owner of the
subject res. Empresa was found not to
be in privity and therefore res judicata
did not bar the in personam suit The
court explained that Empresa's interest
in the in rem action was strictly
representative and separate from its in
terest in an action to impose in per
sonam liability. The court thus con
cluded that Empresa's liability had not
been previously adjudicated. However,
the court also held that Empresa was
collaterally estopped from contesting li
ability or damages as these issues had
been adjudicated in the in rem proceed
ings and that Empresa was bound by
virtue of the principle of respondeat su
perior.

Confirming the findings of the district
court, the second circuit affirmed the
lower court's judgment in all respects.
In a dissent, Judge Jacobs questioned
the majority's holding that the facts
relied upon to establish collateral
estoppel did not also establish res
judicata as to Empresa. Judge Jacobs
opined that Empresa, as bareboat
charterer, was in privity with the ship
and that further actions against Empresa
were therefore barred by resjudicata.
Christopher T Scanlon
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personam.

The court of appeals then proceeded to
discuss the in rem j udgment creditor's
ability to secure an in personam judgment
for the deficiency. Stating that Supple
mental Rule C( 1 )(b) of the Federal Rules
F a11 1995
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SALV AG E CL AIM DOES NOT
SUP ERSEDE P REF ERRED SH IP
M ORTG AG E IN ABSENCE OF
REASONABL E APP REH ENSION
OF M ARINE P ERIL
Salvage lie n asse rted for ve sse l se r
vice s not re nde red as a re su lt of
" re asonabl( yJ app re he n[ded) " ma
rine pe ri l d oe s not su pe rsede p re
fe rred mortgage i n acc ord ance with
pu rp ose s of 1920 Ship M ortgage Ac t.
(Faneuil Advisors, inc. v.

0/S Sea

Hawk. CA l , 50 F. 3d 88, 3129195)

In the early morn
ing hours of July
1 5 , 1 992, David
Kinchla (Kinchla)
and his son tried to
�-! retake possession
of the Sea Hawk, a
fishing boat they had abandoned to state
custody after having filed for Chapter
I I bankruptcy. Kinchla intended to
tow the boat out to sea from the harbor
of Hampton-Seabrook, New Hamp
shire, but did not make the necessary re
quest for the opening of the Hampton
River Bridge. The bridge blocked the
Kinchlas' exit from the harbor and,
while maneuvering under it, they lost
control in the current, slamming the
hull into a bridge support. The current
then shifted the boat and it slid back
wards stem first under the bridge, dam
aging its bridge-superstructure and out
rigger tuna poles. Although the Kinch
las were able to abscond, the Coast
Guard caught up with them and brought
the duo and the Sea Hawk to the state
pier, where the Kinchlas were arrested.
The saga began in January 1 988, when
Kinchla purchased the 45-foot Sea
Hawk, by taking out a $ 1 48,000 note
with Atlantic Financial Federal Savings
and Loan Association (Atlantic); there
after, Kinchla granted Atlantic a first
preferred ship mortgage. Subsequently,
Atlantic went into receivership and was
taken over by Resolution Trust Com
pany (RTC), which sold the mortgage
to Faneuil Advisors, Inc. (Faneuil) on
April 23, 1 993.
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During the time leading up to the pur
chase of Kinchla's mortgage by Faneuil,
Kinchla stopped making payments on his
note and filed a petition for bankruptcy
on January 6, 1 992. On June 3, 1 992, the
Sea Hawk began its travail when it broke
free from its harbor moorings and drifted
until it snagged near the Hampton River
Bridge. William Cronin (Cronin), a har
bormaster of the New Hampshire State
Port Authority, towed the boat to a state
pier with the help of the U.S. Coast
Guard. Cronin contacted Kinchla, the
seeming owner, but Kinchla told Cronin
he had abandoned his interest in the Sea
Hawk.
Subsequently, Cronin tried to
contact the mortgage holder. Because the
state had no facility large enough to store
the Sea Hawk, Cronin arranged with a lo
cal individual to take custody of the boat
until ownership could be ascertained
telling that person that he would have �
possessory lien on the boat for towing
and storage. After Kinchla's attempt to
retake the boat, the individual declined
further involvement.
At that point, Portsmouth Harbor Tow
ing (PHT) was contacted by Cronin who
asked the company to tow the Sea Hawk
to Portsmouth, New Hampshire to store it
safely in dry storage. PHT consented and
consequently stowed, stored, maintained
and repaired the boat over a period of fif
teen months, trying fruitlessly on several
occasions to contact the Sea Hawk's
mortgage holder to establish a claim.
PHT claimed a salvage lien but never
brought an action to foreclose on it.
In October 1 993, Faneuil initiated an in
rem proceeding in district court against

the Sea Hawk to foreclose on its mort
gage. Federal marshals arrested and
took custody of the vessel in December
1 993, whereupon PHT intervened in
January I994 in order to assert its sal
vage lien. The Sea Hawk was sold at
auction netting $32,537.20- not
enough to cover the claims of Faneuil
( $ 1 77,676) and PHT ($30,885). The
district court held that PHT had a valid
salvage lien which had priority over
Faneuil's claim since PHT had spent
"much time and effort in preserving the
Sea Hawk." Faneuil appealed to the
first circuit.
The questions raised in the case were
whether an unattended vessel's in
evitable deterioration could be con
strued as a "marine peril" and whether a
vessel in safe custody of a state officer
could "reasonably be apprehended" to
be facing marine peril giving rise to a
valid salvage claim. In its review and
reversal of the district court in favor of
Faneuil, the appeals court found that:
( l ) repairs, supplies, storage and towing
were ordinary "necessaries" and there
fore subordinate to a preferred ship
mortgage and (2) PHT failed to prove
marine peril or a reasonable apprehen
sion thereof necessary to establish a sal
vage claim.
The first circuit began its analysis by
reviewing the priorities established by
the 1 920 Ship Mortgage Act. 46 U.S.C.
§ 3 0 1 0 1 -3 1 343. The court noted that,
prior to passage of the Act, a mortgage
on a ship was outranked in admiralty
proceedings by ordinary maritime liens
on a ship, even those arising after the
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458 ( l Oth Cir. 1 990). However, the Act
changed the law by granting priority to
preferred ship mortgage holders over all
other claims with limited exceptions.
Further, the court did not recognize the
services provided by PHT as anything
more than "necessaries," a category not
enumerated among the Act's exceptions
as a "preferred maritime lien," which
could possibly trump the mortgage. 46
U.S.C. § 3 1 3 0 1 (4).
The court went on to examine the
straits the Sea Hawk was in at the time
she was recovered from the Kinchlas
and turned over to PHT for safekeep
ing. Examining the general maritime
law, the court did not find that the or
phaned Sea Hawk was in "immediate or
absolute peril," because Cronin, as
agent for the State of New Hampshire,
had a duty to care for her. The court
held that the lower court had clearly
erred in elevating PHT' s claim over the
preferred mortgage.
"In holding that the circumstances
consituted a reasonable apprehension of
marine peril, the district court misreads
the salvage cases holding that marine
peril need not be immediate or absolute.
While it is true that the threat need not
be imminent, * * * the cases make
apparent that the threat must be some
thing more than the inevitable deterio
ration that any vessel left unattended
would suffer; * * *." Faneuil, 50 F.3d
at 93 (emphasis in original). "Such a
result could hardly be squared with the
intent of the Ship Mortgage Act." !d.
Finally, the court noted that state liens
could not lie as an exception to the pre
emption rights of the preferred mort
gage holders nor were "expansive no
tions" of equity enough to subordinate
Faneuil's claim to that of PHT.
Servs. , Inc.
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